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In Defense of the Outrageous
Government Conduct Defense
in the Federal Courts*
INTRODUCTION
A. The Sting
Visualize yourself as the successful owner of a small business'
receiving a visit from a friend whom you have known for more than ten
years. The friend tells you about the miserable state into which her life
has fallen. She describes her desperate financial situation and tells you
that she will have to sell her family's food stamps to buy Christmas
presents for her children. You tell her that you feel sorry for her, but
when she asks you to buy the food stamps, you resist the temptation and
refuse.
Then you are stunned when the same friend appears at your place of
business dressed in rags. Once again, she tells you about her urgent need
for cash. Finally, out of pity for your old friend, and perhaps fear that
your business will be disrupted again, you agree to pay her for the food
stamps. One of your employees also listens to her sad tale of poor health
and mounting financial problems. The employee also agrees to help out
by buying the food stamps for cash.
Once the sales have been completed, your friend tells you and your
employee that she has been recording your conversations and that she is
an undercover operative for the United States Department of Agriculture.
You are arrested by federal law enforcement officials. Later, you find out
that as payment for her work as an operative, your friend was allowed to
keep half of all the money she got from people like you. You wonder
* This Note is partially based on research collected for a treatise on substantive
federal criminal law to be published in 1996 by West Publishing Company. The treatise
authors, Norman Abrams, Sara Beale, Pam Bucy, and Sarah Welling, gratefully
acknowledge permission from West Publishing to use some of that material in this Note.
' The facts described in this hypothetical reflect the facts of United States v. Tucker,
28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defense of outrageous government conduct
is no longer viable in the Sixth Circuit), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995). For
discussion of this case, see infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
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how or why she came to you to set you up for an arrest on federal charges
of trafficking in food stamps. You puzzle over how you fell for her phony
story - why did you allow your affection or pity for an old friend to cloud
your judgment so? What's more, you are also charged with aiding and
abetting the illegal food stamp trafficking because your employee became
involved.
A few days later, you begin to think more about the big picture. Is the
crime of trafficking in food stamps really so heinous or rampant that the
federal government needs to spend money tricking people into committing it?
Should a paid agent of the law enforcement authorities be able to randomly
pick out people to set up like this? Should she be making money based on
how many people she convinces to commit crime?
Then, you really start thinking about what will happen to you. You know
you committed the crime, but is there any defense available to you? Will it
matter that your case will be tried in the Sixth Circuit as opposed to any other
federal circuit?
B. The Interests at Stake
In the above hypothetical, the government's agent may have chosen the
target of her sting simply because the agent believed her to be vulnerable to
such emotional appeals, or because she had a personal vendetta against her,
because her name was the next in the agent's address book, or because the
agent had a valid reason to believe that, given the opportunity, the targeted
person would participate in illegal activity. In the federal court system, it
would not matter which, if any of these, was the reason for the agent's
targeting decision. It does not matter that the agent was paid on a contingent
fee basis for successfully convincing targets to buy food stamps illegally. Nor
does it matter that the target initially resisted the offer but later gave in
because of friendship or sympathy. The only issue that determines the
availability of an entrapment defense to a defendant targeted in a sting is
whether she was predisposed to commit the offense.
Contrary to the current state of federal law, the people of the United
States have an interest in preventing capricious targeting of defendants in
sting operations.2 If defendants are punished and government agents are not
sanctioned in any way, all of society suffers. Society and the courts are
essentially condoning the practice of manufacturing crime. Without inquiry
into the reasons for targeting defendants, the courts leave the door open to
abuse. By focusing on the predisposition of defendants rather than on the
2 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); see infra notes 54-66 and
accompanying text.
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conduct of government agents, the government implies that it is better to
manufacture crime and catch criminals than to refrain from manufacturing
crime and risk missing some.
This is, however, a false dilemma? Society and the courts do not have
to choose between manufacturing crime and letting criminals go free; they
could catch criminals without manufacturing crime and at the same time
maintain an objective check on the conduct of the agents.4 One simple
approach would be a per se prohibition on government involvement in sting
operations. Such a rule would be impractical, however, because it is difficult
to detect consensual crime without government infiltration of criminal
activity. A more practical, as well as more equitable, solution would be to
require that the government only target someone when it can demonstrate
some reasonable basis for believing that person was already planning to
commit crime. This could be accomplished by excluding evidence obtained
in an undercover sting where the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to target
the defendant.
C. Focus of this Note
This Note will examine how the federal courts have addressed the due
process defense of outrageous government conduct. Since this defense has
developed predominately as a corollary to the defense of entrapment, the Note
begins with a preliminary review of the entrapment defense.5 The Note then
explores the contours of the due process defense as it has developed in the
federal courts, focusing on the level of suspicion required before a defendant
may be targeted.' It will examine a recent decision involving the defense 7
and conclude by suggesting a limitation on the conduct of government agents
3 See Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Journey
Back, 27 AM. CPiM. L. REV. 457, 462 (1990) ("We should not permit the government to
prosecute individuals where the government conduct itself was outrageous or egregious.
We should not permit such prosecutions, not because a particular person's rights were
violated, but ratherbecause such government activity, in Justice Frankfurter's words, does
'more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.' "(quoting
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172)).
4 In his concurring opinion in United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), cited in Marcus, supra note 3, at 463, Judge
Easterbrook phrased the [false] dilemma this way: "When push comes to shove, we
should reject the contention that the criminal must go free because the constable was too
zealous."
5 See infra notes 9-50 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
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in sting operations that has been left open by the United States Supreme
Court.
8
I. A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
A. Historical Background
Entrapment is an affirmative defense based on the idea that a defendant
was induced to commit the crime by a government agent. The defense was
neither recognized by English law nor by early American law.' In this
century, however, American courts have accepted the defense in a variety of
criminal prosecutions. 1° The defense was brought to the notice of the public
because of the extensive media coverage it received when it was raised in the
"Abscam" cases" and in the prosecution of millionaire John DeLorean. 12
8 See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
9 One nineteenth century American court concluded:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this case, the
allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as
the world, and first interposed in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled me and I did
eat." That defence was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate
we may form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the
tempter, this plea has never smce availed to shield crime or give indemnity to
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say
christian ethics, it never will.
Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) (Bacon, J.),
quoted in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 399 (8th ed. 1994).
" The first federal court recognition of the defense was in Woo Wai v. United States,
223 F. 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1915). For a comprehensive history of the defense in federal
courts up to 1982, see S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501.9 (1981), micro-
formed on CIS No. 82-S523-I (Congressional Info. Serv.).
" Abscam "is an acronym combining the first two letters of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd.,
a fictitious Middle Eastern corporation, and the word 'scam,'. . . ."Bennett L. Gershman,
Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1565 n.1
(1982). The FBI formed Abscam "as a front to receive stolen property," id., and, later
used Abscam to offer bribes to U.S. Congressmen, id., bringing widespread attention to
the defense of entrapment, which was offered by the defendants. See, e.g., United States
v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983). For analysis of
the Abscam cases and a complete list of Abscam case cites, see Maura F.J. Whelan,
Comment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the
EntrapmentDefensewith a ReasonableSuspicionRequirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193,
1193 n.5, 1200-03 (1985).
12 John DeLorean was prosecuted in federal court and acquitted based on the defense
of entrapment. The jury was instructed to apply the subjective test for entrapment. See
infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Apparently, the jurors instead applied an
objective test and acquitted him because of their distaste for the government's methods.
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE
Entrapment is a common law defense as there is no statutory
definition of it.'" The defense is often raised in drug-related offenses,' 4
and it has recently been raised in prosecutions for other consensual
crimes,' 5 such as receiving child pornography through the mail,'6
bribery,' 7 money laundering, 8 and trafficking in food stamps.' 9
Government encouragement to commit a crime is not prohibited per
se. For example, merely setting a trap to ensnare a criminal is not
entrapment.2" As Chief Justice Warren's often repeated test describes it:
For a description of the DeLorean case, see Whelan, supra note 11, at 1197-1200.
'3 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 & n.1 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-45 (1932); S. REP. No. 307,
supra note 10, at 127; see also Fred W. Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections
on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses in Federal Court, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 829, 831-42 (1992) (providing an historical, substantive, and procedural
overview of the entrapment defense); Michael DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to
CriminalResponsibility:ItsHistory, Theory, and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243,244-
52 (1967) (overviewing the common law development of the doctrine).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 19 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (7th Cir. 1994).
"s Consensual or "victimless" crimes are defined as those in which the criminal is
the only party to the crime as opposed to crimes in which a party is included without
consent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1567-68 (6th ed. 1990). Since there is no incentive
for the involved parties to report these crimes, law enforcement officials frequently use
undercover agents (either officials operating incognito or confidential informants acting
under the instruction of government officials) to catch the criminals in a "sting" operation.
It is these sting operations that give rise to the defense of entrapment. If a defendant has
committed an offense which involves an undercover government agent, the defense of
entrapment may be available (provided the elements of the defense are met). If a
defendant has committed exactly the same offense without any government involvement,
the defense of entrapment is generally not available, although a possible defense of
"private," "derivative," or "vicarious" entrapment has been recognized in dicta. See
United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing an
imaginable defense of vicarious entrapment but basing its holding on another issue) (citing
United States v. Cruz, 783 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1983));
United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943, 947-48 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
McLermon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1108-09 (6th Cir. 1984). But seeUnited States v. Twigg, 588
F.2d 373, 376-80 (3d Cir. 1978) (allowing the entrapment defense for one defendant who
was brought into a criminal enterprise by a government informant while denying it to a
second defendant who was brought into the enterprise by the first defendant).
16 See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (1992); United States v.
Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 960 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 269 (1994).
17 See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 59-62 (1988); United States v.
Sandoval, 20 F.3d 134, 136-39 (5th Cir. 1993).
1S See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1993).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Eldeeb, 20 F.3d 841,842-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 269 (1994).
2 Gendron, 18 F.3d at 960.
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"To determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be
drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal."2 A court must evaluate where that line is to be
drawn based on the facts of each case by focusing on the individual
defendant's predisposition.22
The entrapment defense is supported by two distinct rationales. The
first is that persons should not be held liable for acts they would not have
committed without encouragement from the government. 23 A second is
that the government ought to spend its resources stopping crime rather
than encouraging people to commit it.24 These rationales have translated
into two definitions of the entrapment defense: the subjective approach,
21 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
' Since the focus of the defense is on the defendant's predisposition, not the conduct
of the government, merely setting a trap or providing an opportunity to commit a crime
is not entrapment. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the Supreme Court
reiterated its holdings in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441 (1932) and Sherman,
356 U.S. at 372.
[Those cases] both recognize "that the fact that officers or employees of the
Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the
offense does not defeat the prosecution." Nor will the mere fact of deceit defeat
a prosecution, for there are circumstances when the use of deceit is the only
practicable law enforcement technique available. It is only when the Govern-
ment's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the
defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 435-36 (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (quoting Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 441)).
23 This statement represents the current federal law, discussed infra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text, otherwise referred to as the subjective approach. The most recent
Supreme Court ruling on the defense was in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540
(1992). The majority in Jacobson stated that the defense is applicable "[w]hen the
Government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding
citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law." Id.
at 553-54. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court inUnited States v. Becker, 62 F.2d
1007 (2d Cir. 1933), stated: "The whole doctrine derives from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent, though ductile,
persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist." Id. at 1009.
24 This statement summarizes the view taken by minorities of the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 68-73 (1988) (White, J., dissenting); United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-50 (1973) (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Sherman,
356 U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); by the drafters of the MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.13 (1985); and by many states. SeePAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
(1989). Marcus' work also encompasses the defense of Outrageous Government Conduct,
discussed infra notes 51-144 and accompanying text. The defense of entrapment is not
envisioned by the Supreme Court as a control on government conduct. Russell,411 U.S.
at 433-34.
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which is the current federal law, and the objective approach, which is a
persistent dissenting view.
B. The Subjective Approach: Focus and Rationale
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld a subjective definition
of the entrapment defense.2 1 Under the subjective approach, the govern-
ment must show that a particular defendant was predisposed to commit
the offense before, and independent of, the government's action.26 The
defense exists to allow a defendant to avoid conviction when the
defendant's original criminal intent was implanted by the government.27
To support this theory, courts have found an implied congressional
intent in criminal statutes to avoid conviction of the defendant when
the effect of government conduct has been the manufacture of crime.28
25 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 548-49 (reaffirming the view of the defense first enunciated
in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441); Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62 (reaffirming the view of the
defense first enunciated in Sorrells); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-91
(1975) (plurality opinion) (holding that the defendant did not establish entrapment where
a government agent supplied contraband to a predisposed defendant); Russell, 411 U.S.
at 429 (rejecting the defense when the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime);
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376 (finding entrapment as a matter of law where "the Government
plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes
which he otherwise would not have attempted") (footnote omitted)); Sorrells, 287 U.S.
at 451-52 (stating that predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant to
the "controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the
government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials").
26 Jacobson defined predisposition to include only that which the defendant had
before any action on the part of the government to induce the conduct. 503 U.S. at 550-
54. For a discussion of elements, see infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
27 The court has repeatedly declined to overturn the subjective test. See, e.g.,
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89 (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 429) (citations omitted):
In Russell,... [w]e reaffirmed the principle of Sorrells v. United States and
Sherman v. United States that the entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent
or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime," rather than upon the
conduct of the Government's agents. We ruled out the possibility that the
defense... could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such
as this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was
established.
28 A Constitutional basis for the defense of entrapment was suggested in the Court's
opinion in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (stating that stealth and strategy are necessary and
permissible law enforcement weapons, but when the criminal design originates with the
government, they "become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and
the unlawful search.").
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The Supreme Court has consistently insisted that the defense of entrap-
ment does not exist to "give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot
veto' over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve." 29 The
current law has both supporters and critics.3"
C. The Objective Approach: Focus and Rationale
Early in the development of the defense, a minority of the Supreme
Court concluded that the focus of the defense should not be the individu-
al defendant's subjective predisposition to commit the crime. Rather,
the focus should be on the intrusiveness of the government's conduct.
This approach has come to be known as the objective test for entrap-
ment.31
Under this view, entrapment occurs when an ordinary person would
have been enticed to commit the offense by the conduct of the govern-
ment agent. 2 The main distinction between the two approaches is that
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly based its subjective approach on this
implied legislative intent. See. e.g., Russell, 411 U.S. at 435:
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not in any authority of
the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been
'overzealous law enforcement,' but instead in the notion that Congress could not
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the
elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the
government.
29 Russell, 411 U.S. at 435 ("[Although the lower courts have expanded the
holdings of Sorrells and Sherman] ... to bar prosecutions because of what they
thought to be ... 'overzealous law enforcement' [practices] ... the defense of
entrapment enunciated in those opinions was not intended to give the federal judiciary
a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not ap
prove.").
30 For criticism and support of the subjective approach as it has devel-
oped in the federal courts, see MARCUS, supra note 24, ch. 2; Leslie Abramson &
Lisa Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 139 (1980) (analysis by court level and circuit); Louis Seidman, The
Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV.
111, 117-19 (topical analysis of the various formulations of the entrapment de-
fense).
"' Justice Roberts described an objective test for entrapment in his dissenting opinion
in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454-55 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter labeled the
test "as objective a test as the subject matter permits" in his concurrence, joined by
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
32 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384.
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the predisposition of the defendant is irrelevant under the objective
approach while under the subjective approach, it is all important.33 The
current federal law is that the focus should rest on the subjective
predisposition of the defendant, but strong opposition to that view
remains.34
33 S. REP. No. 307, supra note 10, at 126-27 (footnotes omitted) compares and
contrasts the two approaches:
A comparison of the competing views of the entrapment defense as they
have emerged ... reveals a considerable area of common ground .... Under
either theory, for example, entrapment may result only from governmental
inducement; inducement... by a private person does not establish the defense.
Similarly both [approaches] recognize that undercover activity, artifice,
stratagem, as well as the mere furnishing of an opportunity or facility to commit
an offense, do not constitute unlawful entrapment. Where the two theories differ
almost exclusively is on the question whether predisposition of the defendant
is an element of the defense. While this difference may result in divergent
conclusions being reached as to the availability of the defense in certain factual
settings, it is relatively rare for Federal agents to engage in active inducement
beyond the level that would cause a normally law-abiding person to be unable
to resist commission of an offense.
Since, under the [subjective approach] the entrapment defense is not
constitutionally rooted but reflects a judicial determination of Congress'
implicit intent in enacting penal statutes not to entrap individuals, it follows
that Congress may ... construe certain statutes ... as not allowing the
defense.
34 For example, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985) adopted the objective approach
to the entrapment defense. Subsection (1) provides that the defense is available when a
law enforcement official or person acting in cooperation with such an official induces or
encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting an offense by either "(a)
making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct
is not prohibited; or (b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement that create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who
are ready to commit it." Subsection (2) states that a defendant "shall be acquitted if he
proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an
entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the [c]ourt in the absence of the
jury." Subsection (3) disallows the defense where "causing or threatening bodily injury
is an element of the offense charged" and the defendant causes or threatens bodily injury
to someone other than the official who perpetrates the entrapment. For rationale, historical
analysis, and procedural implications of this section, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13
commentary (1985).
For support and criticism of the objective approach and a comparison to the
subjective approach, see Bennett, supra note 13, at 833-38; Scott Paton, Note, "The
Government Made Me Do It": A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v.
United States, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 995, 1029-31 (1994).
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D. Elements of the Defense
The entrapment defense has two elements." These elements are 1)
a government agent induced the defendant to commit the offense, and 2)
the defendant was not predisposed to commit it.36 Once the defendant
raises some evidence of inducement, the burden of proof shifts to the
government to prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
offense.37
1. Government Inducement
Inducement to commit an offense may be proper or improper.3"
Proper inducement occurs when a government agent merely provides an
opportunity to commit an offense, makes commission of the offense
easier, or participates in the conduct that the offense requires.39 Mere
" The Supreme Court has defined the defense as consisting of two elements in, for
example, Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988). For pattern jury
instructions employing the subjective test, see infra note 39.36 Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62-63. But see United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593,
598-602 (7th Cir. 1993) (identifying lack of "readiness"or lack of a demonstrated, present
ability to commit the offense as a new element of the defense and distinguishing that
element from predisposition); United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir.
1988) (stating that the two elements of the defense are "inducement and unreadiness")
(citing United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 416 (1st Cir. 1988)).
17 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (plurality opinion). See
MARCUS, supra note 24, § 6.05 (describing the quantum of evidence required to shift the
burden of proof to the government).
18 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States v. Gendron,
18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 654 (1994) (citing United States v.
Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (Ist Cir. 1987); United States v. Espinal, 757 F.2d 423, 425
(1st Cir. 1985); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).
39 See, e.g., 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.04 (Comm. of Federal
Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit ed., 1980); MANUAL OF MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 9.01
(Comm. on Model Criminal Jury Instructions Within the Eighth Circuit ed., 1994);
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 6.02 &
cmt. (Comm. on Model Jury Instructions, Ninth Circuit ed., 1992); PATTERN CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 6.03(4) (Comm. on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Sixth Circuit
District Judges Ass'n ed., 1991); PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES, WITH
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS § 9 (Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions, District Judges
Ass'n, Eleventh Circuit ed., 1985); see S. REP. No. 307, supra note 10, at n.177. ("This
does not mean that every time a person is entrapped by a government official the defense
is available. The public servant must be acting in an official capacity, offering
inducements for a legitimate law enforcement purpose rather than in aid of a criminal
frolic of his own such as a bribe.") (citing United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 960-61
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repetition of offers of opportunities to commit an offense does not
exceed the scope of proper inducement efforts.4" Improper inducement,
on the other hand, occurs when government conduct exceeds the mere
provision of an opportunity to commit the offense and includes a
further step to encourage the commission of the offense.4' If the
defendant were predisposed to commit the offense, however, the defense
is ultimately unavailable regardless of the inducement offered by the
agent.
42
2. Lack of Predisposition
To overcome a showing of improper inducement, the government
must show that the defendant was willing to commit the offense
independent of any action taken by the government. If the defendant was
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting); Malatkofski v. United States, 179 F.2d 905,
917-18 (1st Cir. 1950)).
40 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (citing five Supreme Court
cases and other cases for the proposition that government agents may offer opportunities
or facilities for the commission of an offense without barring prosecution).
41 Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961-62; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (1985), citedin
Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962. For other examples, see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
429-30 (1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376; Sorrells,287 U.S. at 442-43; United States v.
Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812-15 (1st Cir. 1988).
The distinction between proper and improper inducement is not necessarily an
intuitive one.
Examples of official conduct held not to constitute entrapment as a matter
of law have been the following:
(1) decoy letters soliciting the mailing of obscene material;
(2) using a decoy letter containing money to trap an embezzling postal
employee;
(3) undercover purchase of contraband;
(4) supplying essential ingredient or facility, which may be difficult to
obtain, for commission of offense;
(5) feigning interest in a bribe offer;
(6) offer of bribe to officer suspected of corruption in an amount not
exceeding the degree of temptation to which he would normally be exposed;
(7) use of a contingent fee arrangement to pay informers;
(8) informer's mention to defense counsel of his relationship to prospective
juror, precipitating suggestion that juror be corruptly approached;
(9) allowing completed delivery of intercepted contraband or incriminating
evidence, where defendant set the chain of events in motion;
(10) failing to remove a corrupt officer so as to preclude a bribe offer.
S. REP. No. 307, supra note 10, at 128 (footnotes omitted).
4
' Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (plurality opinion). See
Seidman, supra note 30.
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predisposed to commit the offense before the government agent induced
its commission, the defense is unavailable.43
The Supreme Court clarified this element in Jacobson v United
States.4 In that child pornography case, the defendant received repeated
invitations and inquiries from several fictitious organizations.4 ' He was
also invited to place orders with several businesses.46 Many of the
communications from the bogus organizations employed by the govern-
ment referred to freedom of speech and censorship.47 The Court held
that Jacobson's conviction for receiving child pornography could not be
upheld because the government had not shown that Jacobson "was
predisposed, independent of the Government's acts and beyond a
reasonable doubt, to violate the law by receiving child pornography
through the mails."48 In other words, by the time he committed the
43 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89. See Seidman, supra note 30.
44 503 U.S. 540 (1992). The Jacobson decision did not invent the requirement that
the government must prove predisposition independent of government action. See id. at
549 n.2. For a discussion of this holding in the context of prior Supreme Court decisions
describing the predisposition element, see Paton, supra note 34.
4' The Court paid particular attention to the spirit of the communications sent to
Jacobson by the government. The bogus organizations were: "the American Hedonist
Society" (an organization with the doctrine that "members had the 'right to read what we
desire, the right to discuss similar interests with those who share our philosophy, and...
the right to seek pleasure without restrictions being placed on us by outdated puritan
morality"'). Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 543; "Midlands Data Research" (which sought
information from people who "'believe in the joys of sex and the complete awareness of
those lusty and youthful lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] age' "), id. at 544; "Heartland
Institute for a New Tomorrow" (a lobbying organization with the goal "to repeal 'all
statutes related to regulation of sexual activities' "), id.; "Produit Outouais" (a "Canadian"
mail order company), id. at 546; and "Far Eastern Trading Company, Ltd." (offering to
avoid the "prying eyes of U.S. Customs" by sending materials through the mail via
"American solicitors"), id. at 546-47.
The Court stated:
[T]he strong arguable inference is that, by waving the banner of individual
rights and disparaging the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict
the availability of sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited
petitioner's interest in sexually explicit materials banned bylaw but also exerted
substantial pressure on petitioner to obtain and read such material as part of a
fight against censorship and the infringement of individual rights.
Id. at 552.
46 Jacobson had been targeted for investigation because, at a time when such
materials were legal, he had ordered pornographic materials from a bookstore, and his
name appeared on apostal inspector's list because it had been on that bookstore's mailing
list. Id. at 543.
"7 See supra note 45.
41 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554.
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offense Jacobson had already been so inundated by governmental
inducement that he had been made predisposed to commit the offense by
that inducement.49 Thus, the government must prove that a defendant
was: 1) predisposed to commit the offense; and 2) so predisposed before
any government action inducing the commission of the offense."0
II. THE DUE PRocEss DEFENSE
OF OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
A. Historical Background
The theory behind the due process defense is that conduct by the
government could be so unreasonable and unfair that it violates the defen-
dant's Constitutional due process right.5' This defense has not been
accepted by all the circuits, and is rarely successful in those circuits that
do accept it. 2 In the circuits that accept the due process defense, it may
be supported by showing either 1) that the defendant's right to due
process has been violated or 2) by appealing to the court's general
supervisory powers to curtail the overreaching of law enforcement offi-
cials that it finds shocking.
53
In 1952, the Supreme Court addressed due process concerns about the
conduct of law enforcement officials in Rochin v California.4 In
Rochin, law enforcement officers acting with "'some information that
[the defendant] was selling narcotics"' entered a defendant's home where
they saw the defendant put two capsules in his mouth.55 The officers
"attempted to extract the capsules" and when that proved unsuccessful,
they took him to a hospital where "[a]t the direction of one of the officers
a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach
49 id.
50 SeeUnited States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961-62 (1st Cir.) (comparing another
child pornography case to Jacobson on the predisposition element), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 654 (1994); see also Seidman, supra note 30, at 118-20.
"' United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
52 For a circuit-by-circuit analysis of this defense up to 1980, see Abramson &
Lindeman, supra note 30.
53 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 898 (1987).
14 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
" Id. at 166.
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against his will." 6 Following this procedure, the officers recovered two
morphine capsules in the vomited matter. 7 These two capsules were the
principal evidence used to convict Rochin. 8 The conviction was
affirmed by the intermediate appellate state court even though the officers
had illegally entered the defendant's home, beaten him, and taken him to
the hospital. 9
The California Supreme Court declined to hear Rochin's appeal, but
two members of that court, dissenting to the denial, noted that such
conduct by law enforcement officers would have resulted in exclusion of
any resulting verbal confession." The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the conviction, but based its holding on due process
grounds rather than on analysis of the illegal search and seizure." After
considering the difficulty of defining due process precisely,62 the Court
recognized that, in this case, the conduct of the officers was simply so
shocking that it violated Constitutional protections of due process.63 The
Court stated: "It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the
course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in
order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his
mind but can extract what is in his stomach."' The Court completed the
analogy of the forced stomach pumping to forced confessions by
comparing the rationales for exclusion in both situations.
Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and
decency So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough
was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to
afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to
discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of society."
561d.
57 d.
58 Id.9 Id. at 166-67.
6
1 Id. at 167 (quoting Rochin v. People, 225 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Cal. 1952)).
61 Id. at 168 ("This Court granted certiorari because a serious question is raised as
to the limitations which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
on the conduct of criminal proceedings by the [s]tates." (citations omitted)).
62 Id. at 169-72.
63 1d. at 172.
64Id. at 173.
5 Id. at 173-74. See MARCUS, supra note 24, at 273 ("Many commentators and
judges have argued that the analysis in Rochin is not limited to violations of privacy or
even the kind of brutal tactics used by the police there. Instead, it is argued that this
analysis should apply to all contacts between government officers and private citizens
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Finally, the Court was careful to narrow its holding to the officers'
conduct in that case.
6
In 1973, the Supreme Court left the door open for an entrapment-like
defense based on due process violations by law enforcement officers.67
In United States v Russell, an undercover government agent assigned to
locate a suspected methamphetamine lab approached Russell." The
agent supplied an essential and rare chemical used in the production of
the drug.69 Russell was convicted after asserting an entrapment defense
and on appeal argued that, even though a reasonable jury could have
found him predisposed to commit the offense, there was entrapment as
a matter of law.70 The court of appeals focused on the government
agent's level of participation in the offense in reversing the conviction.7"
Before the Supreme Court, Russell urged the adoption of an
exclusionary rule based on a revised constitutional defense of entrapment
since "the same factors that led this Court to apply the exclusionary rule
to illegal searches and seizures and confessions should be considered
here."'72 The Court was unpersuaded, however, since the government's
conduct in that case "violated no independent constitutional right of the
respondent. Nor did [the agent] violate any federal statute or rule or
commit any crime in infiltrating the respondent's drug enterprise.'
73
Russell also urged a per se rule to "preclude any prosecution when it is
shown that the criminal conduct would not have been possible had not an
undercover agent 'supplied an indispensable means to the commission of
the crime that could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or
illegal channels."' 74 The Court declined to adopt this suggested rule as
well and stated:
Even if we were to surmount the difficulties attending the notion that
due process of law can be embodied in fixed rules, and those attending
respondent's particular formulation, the rule he proposes would not
.... ") (citing Edward Mascolo, Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct that
Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not to Be Enticed or Induced to Crime by Government
and its Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1984)).66 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
67 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
68 Id. at 425.
69 Id. at 426.
70 Id. at 427.
71 Id.
71 Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
73 Id.
4 Id. at 431 (citation omitted).
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appear to be of significant benefit to him .... [because], on the record
presented, it appears that he cannot fit within the terms of the very rule
he proposes [since the chemical the agent supplied is not impossible to
obtain and the defendant had in his possession two bottles of it that
were not supplied by the agent].
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invokingjudicial
processes to obtain a conviction.., the instant case is distinctly not of
that breed."
Although the Russell Court left open the possibility of a due process
defense, that possibility was significantly limited three years later in
Hampton v United States.76 In Hampton, the defendant conceded a
predisposition to distribute heroin." The three member plurality of the
Court found that predisposition renders both the entrapment defense and
a due process defense unavailable under United States v Russell." The
two concurring members found that Russell did not preclude a due
process defense when defendants were predisposed, but that the facts of
this case did not require reversal.79 Three members dissented on the
rationale that an entrapment defense focusing on the conduct of the
government would be more appropriate than a subjective approach, and
that under the former, the conviction would be reversed.8" Thus, a
total of five members of the Court held that a defense based on the Due
Process Clause, though not supported here, had not been precluded by
the Court's holding in Russell and did not exclude predisposed defen-
dants.8
The status of the law has not changed. The Supreme Court has left
the door open for the use of the due process defense but has never been
presented with facts that support it. A few lower court cases expressly
recognize the defense.82 On the other hand, one circuit has expressly
75 Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added).
76 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality opinion).
77 Id.
7Id. at 485 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., & White, J.).
71 Id. at 493-94 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).80Id. at 495-500 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
s' MARCUS, supra note 24, at 277-78.
8
2 See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
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rejected any possibility of the defense.83 The defense is frequently raised
but seldom successful.8 4
B. The Due Process Defense Versus Entrapment
The due process defense and the defense of entrapment could easily
arise from the same facts 5 but are two distinct defenses.8 6 Entrapment
is an affirmative defense focusing, primarily on the predisposition of the
defendant as determined by a jury.87
The defendant who asserts a due process claim, on the other hand,
asks the court to overturn a conviction or dismiss an indictment based
on the government's actions, notwithstanding the defendant's own
predisposition.8 In fact, the due process claim is often not even
viewed as a defense, since technically, it is generally raised in a prelimi-
nary motion to dismiss the indictment.8 9 Whether the defendant's due
process right has been violated is a question of law to be decided by the
court.90
83 United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defense
could not prevail for three reasons: Hampton effectively overruled the dictum in Russell;
the court lacked authority to exercise its supervisory powers where no independent
constitutional right was violated; and there were constitutional separation of powers
concerns).
" See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement
Authoritiesin Inducing or Co-Operating in Criminal Offenses Raises Due Process Defense
Distinctfrom Entrapment, 97 A.L.R. FED. 273, 285 (1990).
15 For example, the principle case from which the defense is derived, United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), was one in which the defendant raised both the
defense of entrapment and the claim of a due process violation. Both claims were also
raised in United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (one of many Abscam
cases).
" See, e.g., United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1576-77 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The
outrageous governmental conduct defense is distinct from the entrapment defense because
[the latter] considers the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. In contrast,
[the former] looks only at the government's conduct" (citations omitted)); Marcus, supra
note 3, at 457. The due process defense is also distinct from the "objective approach." See
supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. While both defenses focus on the behavior of
government officials, the due process defense is based on constitutional protections, while
the objective entrapment defense relies on the general supervisory powers of the court.
87See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
8 United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 959 (1992).
9 United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
9 0 Marcus, supra note 3, at 458-59 (citing United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319,
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C. When the Defense is Raised
The Supreme Court has never approved a defense based on due
process violations resulting from government overreaching. In view of the
Supreme Court's reluctance, "the lower federal courts have been sparing
in their approval."'" The defense has been raised in offenses involving,
inter alia: drugs;92 child pornography;93 bribery;94 bootlegging; 95 es-
cape from prison;" credit card fraud;97 mail and wire fraud;98 coun-
terfeiting;99 currency reporting violations;' 0 sale, possession, transpor-
tation, or exportation of explosives, weapons, and firearms;' food
stamp fraud;02 theft, burglary, and conversion; 10 3 fish and game viola-
tions; l°4 extortion; °5 criminal contempt;' °6 jury tampering;"' ille-
gal transportation of aliens;' and arson.'0 9
1322 (5th Cir. 1977) (due process claim is a question of law for the judge), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 923 (1978)).
91 Thomas, supra note 84, at 279.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 872
F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1989).
" See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1984).
9' See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
96 See, e.g., Unitd States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S.
869 (1986).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091 (2d Cir. 1985).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 540 F.2d 1152 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1000 (1976).
10. See, e.g., United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985).
10' See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 615 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1980).
10 2 See, e.g., United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1982).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980).
'0' See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1019 (1987).
,0' See, e.g., United Statesv. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied,481
U.S. 787 (1984).
lO6 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 780 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 481
U.S. 787 (1987).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Valdovinos-Valdovinos, 588 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Cal.),
revd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114
(1985).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Among the many law enforcement strategies that defendants argue
violate their constitutional due process right, but which courts nonetheless
uphold, are the following: initiating contact with a target to offer
opportunities to commit a crime; full circle stings;"' using a rela-
tive, sexual partner, or close friend as a government agent to convince the
target to commit an offense;" 2 promises of legitimate and profitable
business deals;" 3 instigating a conspiracy;"' facilitating or encourag-
ing a conspiracy and actually committing the offense;" 5 giving contra-
band to a defendant so that it can be exchanged for other contraband;"
t6
threatening a defendant or his friends;" 7 and deciding to refer a case
for prosecution to federal authorities rather than state authorities, in the
absence of a policy to do so." 8
D. When the Defense Succeeds
Defendants have prevailed in remarkably few cases by using a due
process defense in the lower federal courts." 9 In determining whether
'. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988).
1" A "full circle sting" is one in which a government agent supplies contraband to the
target, who then resells it to another agent. These are typically used in narcotics cases but
are not limited to drug sales. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 530 F.2d 308 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976). But seeUnited States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1975) (holding that a full circle sting violates due process).
'See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986).
" See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 778 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1985).
"4 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 704 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1983).
Is See, e.g., United States v. Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
"6 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1075 (1978).
I' See, e.g., United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 439 (1992).
' 9 For every reported case in which a court of appeals has allowed the defense, there
is at least one example of a case with similar facts in which another federal court has not
allowed the defendant to prevail. See Thomas, supra note 84; see also United States v.
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that due process was violated where
government agents suggested setting up the operation, supplied equipment, expertise, a
location, and raw materials to the defendant at no cost and with very little participation
on the part of the defendant); United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975)
(holding d"full circle" narcotics sting intolerable And reversing the defendant's conviction,
but failing to label the rationale as one based on due process); Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing conviction on account of government
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law enforcement officials violated due process, some courts consider
factors such as whether the defendant instigated the criminal enterprise
or was drawn in by a government agent and whether the defendant was
responsible for directing the enterprise.' However, these factors are
not universally accepted by the circuits and no list of factors has been
announced by the Supreme Court.
E. Targeting of Defendants
One controversial aspect of this defense is whether a defendant may
be targeted for investigation in the absence of a particular level of
suspicion. Criminal defendants have frequently proposed such a require-
ment.' However, none of the circuit courts that have addressed this
issue have held that a demonstrable level of suspicion is required by due
process.' In other words, the fact that the defendant was chosen as a
"enmeshment" in the criminal enterprise which the court found "repugnant to American
criminal justice"); United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(dismissing an indictment on due process grounds where an undercover agent persuaded
a non-predisposed, fellow postal worker to obtain cocaine by using their friendship and
repeatedly asking for the favor; noting that the defendant made no profit on the sales and
had no other customers.); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp 744 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (dismissing an indictment due to the conduct of an undercover agent who set up
a cocaine importation operation and promised defendants that profits from drug sales
would only be used in legitimate business deals; focusing on the complete inability of the
defendants to carry out the offense without the agent who organized the illegal activity.).
But see supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
120 See MARCUS, supra note 24, ch. 7 (identifying factors, such as instigation by the
defendant, active vs. passiveparticipation, control over the criminal enterprise, and noting
which circuits have used these factors).
"2 See cases cited infra note 122, in which the courts of appeals rejected any
requirement for government targeting of an individual.
,22 See, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
a requirement of reasonable suspicion before a defendant may be targeted in a sting
operation but basing this holding on the fact that the focus of the entrapment defense is
on the defendant's subjective predisposition, making the government's knowledge of such
predisposition irrelevant); Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608-09 ("Where the conduct of the
investigation itself does not offend due process, the mere fact that the investigation may
have been commenced without probable cause does not bar the conviction of those who
rise to its bait."), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d
932 (2d Cir.) (sting operations are not prohibited by the Constitution), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970); Kadis
v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967) (declining to rule that entrapment exists
where inducement was offered without a showing of predisposition). The Bleins court
relied on United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 959 (1992); United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 824 & n.13 (D.C. Cir.
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target for a sting prior to any suspicion of wrongdoing does not constitute
outrageous conduct that rises to a level of violating due process.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of
whether due process requires that the government demonstrate some level
of suspicion before targeting an individual in a sting. The Court declined
to examine this question when it accepted Jacobson,123 its most recent
entrapment case, for review. The original Eighth Circuit panel in that case
reversed the conviction because the government agents had not targeted
the defendant based on reasonable suspicion.124 On rehearing, the panel
upheld the conviction because the mere lack of a reasonable basis to
target the defendant did not violate due process and because the defendant
was not entrapped. 5 The opinion issued by the Supreme Court ad-
dressed only the question of whether Jacobson had been entrapped as a
matter of law.'26
In United States v Luttmll,"'27 the Ninth Circuit held that the
government could not target a defendant in a sting operation without a
showing of reasonable suspicion. 2 That opinion, however, was vacated
1984); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 860 (10th Cir. 1984).
See also United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1991) ("In this circuit
the contrary principle has been fixed in the law for almost 70 years and is still viable."
(citing authority from that circuit holding "that the government need not have reasonable
grounds to suspect illegal conduct before offering the opportunity to commit a crime"
(citations omitted)); United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1991) ("We
also join our sibling circuits in rejecting the suggestion ... that the government should
have reasonable suspicionthat an individual is involved in some illegality before targeting
him in a sting operation."); Luttrell, 923 F.2d at 764 (rejecting a "reasoned grounds"
requirement for investigation of an individual under the due process clause); Jenrette,744
F.2d at 824 (holding that failure to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of the defendant
before targeting in a sting did not constitute a violation of due process); Gamble, 737 F.2d
at 860 ("We have held that the government need not have a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing in order to conduct an undercover investigation of a particular person."
(citations omitted)).
'3Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
124 United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 899 F.2d 1549
(1991).
" United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part,
rev'd, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
"'26 Jacobson,503 U.S. at 547-48 n.1 (explaining how the holding in Jacobson applies
to the government's burden of showing predisposition before any inducement).
' 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated in part, 923 F.2d 764 (1991) (en bane)
(original conviction was for conspiracy to possess and traffic in unauthorized and
counterfeit credit card drafts and for attempt to traffic in counterfeit drafts), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 959 (1992).
128 Id. at 814. The three-member panel would have remanded the case for trial since
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on rehearing en banc' 9 In the three-member panel opinion, the court had
imposed a pre-targeting reasonable suspicion requirement and had criticized
"suspicionless investigations" as being "inefficient" and "arbitrary."' 30
However, the three-member panel's opinion was subsequently vacated en
banc without any specific rationale offered by the panel. The Ninth Circuit
simply stated that it would, by rejecting a "reasoned grounds" requirement,
"follow four of our sister circuits."'' In dissent, Circuit Judge Pregerson
stated that purposeful criminal investigation is required by the Bill of Rights,
that targeting a defendant without reasonable suspicion is itself outrageous
government conduct, and that informants should not be allowed to "go out
on fishing expeditions to find targets for undercover sting operations."'
32
F Contingent Fee Arrangements
Another area of interest is the use of paid informants as government
agents in sting operations. The concern is that a conviction based on evidence
supplied by a paid informant, who is eager to earn consideration, may violate
the due process rights of the target of the investigation, when that consider-
ation is based on the informant's performance in the operation.
33
In the three-member panel opinion issued by the Luttrell court,3 4 the
court also focused on the role of confidential informants who "have a strong
incentive to find targets for police investigations.' '135 The court examined
the dangers of using paid informants as follows: *
there were indications in the record that the Secret Service might have had a sufficient
basis for targeting the defendants, but the record was not fully developed. By vacating the
panel opinion en banc, the Ninth Circuit clearly stated that there is no such requirement
in that circuit.
129 United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
30Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 814.
13 Luttrell, 923 F.2d at 764 (en banc).
132 Id. at 764-65 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
131 United States v. Solorio, 37 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the defense
where the informer was paid based on the number of persons convicted, the quantity of
drugs involved, and the value of assets seized). For a discussion of the traditional view
of informants with contingent fee arrangements, see MARCUS, supra note 24, § 7.08
(noting that the claim is generally raised with regard to drug offenses and citing United
States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1985), where the court focuses on society's
legitimate interest in stopping drug trafficking as typical); see also Roger Park, The
Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 197 (1976).
134 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
13 5 Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 808, 813 (informant was paid by the government "to solicit
prospective clients for illegal credit card draft deals ... [while] awaiting sentencing for
a credit card fraud conviction.").
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[I]n this case, the investigation utilized the services of an informant, a
member of a group that in its eagerness to gain rewards does not always
obey the niceties of police protocol. Many informants play their roles
because of completedor prospectivepleabargaining arrangements. They
have a strong incentive to find targets for police investigation, regard-
less of the reasonableness or the accuracy of their information. Their
tips to the police may be based either on legitimate information about
the criminal underworld or they may be wholly fabricated. The origin
of the information may be direct observation or it may be innuendo,
conjecture or even just plain animus. While in some cases informant
activities may be conducted in a fair and decent manner, in others there
appears to be little regard for fundamental concepts of honesty and fair
play. We see substantial reason to scrutinize these operations for
governmental overreaching and to do so with the greatest care.'36
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v Solorio,'37 ad-
dressed this question. In that case, the court was initially under the
impression that the agent was paid based on the number of persons
convicted, the quantity of drugs involved, and the value of assets
seized. 3 The court held that the government's conduct was a violation
of the defendant's due process right because the evidence on which the
conviction was based was likely to be unreliable.' However, the court
withdrew its original opinion based on a motion by the United States.14
The Ninth Circuit subsequently re-issued the opinion, but failed to find
the outrageous governmental conduct discussed in its original deci-
sion. 4' The court failed to find outrageous governmental conduct in its
second opinion because a review of the record convinced the court that
the agent had not been paid a contingency fee based on convictions, but
rather a contingency fee based on "successful" investigations.'42 The
Ninth Circuit stated: "Because the record does not establish that the
informant's fee arrangement was contingent upon obtaining convictions,
we cannot say that, under the totality of the circumstances, [the defen-
dant] was subjected to outrageous government conduct."'43 From this
136Id. at 813-14.
13737 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
138 Id.
139 Id.
4o Solorio, 43 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1995).
14' Solorio, 53 F.3d 341, 1995 WL 242324 (9th Cir. 1994).
142 Solorio, 1995 WL 242324, at *3.
43 Id. at *4.
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language it is logical to infer that the Ninth Circuit would consider the
reverse to be proof of outrageous governmental conduct. It should be
noted that when the Court issued its revised opinion, it chose not to
publish it,'" and under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, unpublished opinions
are not precedential and should not be cited.
III. THE FUTuRE OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
A. United States v. Tucker: The Sixth Circuit Speaks
In United States v. Tucker,'4 the Sixth Circuit took a step beyond
all other federal courts when it plainly stated that the defense of
outrageous government conduct simply does not exist in the Sixth Circuit.
The defendants in Tucker were indicted for purchasing, and aiding and
abetting the purchase of food stamps.1 46 The defendants were targeted
in a reverse sting operation by an "operative" working for the government
whose compensation was half the money she collected from the illegal
sale of the food stamps. 147 The operative, Hancock, had been a friend
of the defendant, Tucker, for more than ten years.' 4 Hancock contacted
Tucker and attempted to induce Tucker to buy food stamps from her by
describing her financial distress. Hancock told her friend how she hoped
to provide a "proper Christmas" for her children. 149 Tucker resisted at
first, but then agreed to the purchase after Hancock appeared at Tucker's
business dressed as if she were in dire financial straits. 50 Tucker then
encouraged Hancock to contact McDonald, Tucker's employee. After
listening to Hancock's story, McDonald also agreed to purchase
Hancock's food stamps.1
5'
The district court dismissed the indictment because the offense of
trafficking in food stamps did not justify the ploys used in the investiga-
tion.'52 The court held that there would be no problem with such
individual tactics as using undercover agents, targeting of an agent's
friends, paying an agent, or using deceptive ploys.'53 However, it held
'44 Solorio, 53 F.3d at 341.
14' 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
146Id. at 1421.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 rd.
150 Id.
15 1 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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that "when they are employed in totality with people who are not
otherwise suspected of engaging in crime.., the conduct ... crosses
[the constitutional] boundary."'54
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo.' 5 The court
began by examining the entrapment defense, and noted that the objective
approach to entrapment had been clearly rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Russell.'56 The court also stated that the language so
often cited in support of the proposition that the door has been left open
for a due process defense was plainly dicta. 57
The court noted that the Sixth Circuit has been presented with more
than two dozen cases in which the defense has been raised, but that "on
the facts" the defense has been rejected every time. 51 Thus, according
to the majority:
[T]here is no authority in this circuit which holds that the government's
conduct in inducing the commission of a crime, if "outrageous" enough,
can bar prosecution of an otherwise predisposed defendant under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.. . . [The cases cited] do
nothing more than "assume" the existence of such a defense while
"holding" that it would not apply under the present facts.... [T]he
legal existence of... [the] "due process" defense is an open question
in this circuit which we are free to address in the first instance.
159
The court next examined authority in other circuits, concluding that
only one other appellate court has barred a prosecution under Russell and
that holding improperly relied on an earlier Third Circuit case which had
been limited by other Third Circuit holdings. 6 The other circuits had
'
5 4 Id. (alteration in Tucker) (citation omitted).
1
55 Id.
1561.d.
'
57 Id. at 1423; see supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
158 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424. For examples of the Sixth Circuit's previous holdings in
which the defense was offered by defendants, but rejected "on the facts," see id.
'9 Id. at 1424-25 (citations omitted). But see id. at 1429 (Martin, J., concurring in
result) (concurring in the result because the government's conduct was not outrageous in
this case, but stating that prior Sixth Circuit opinions recognizing the existence of an
"outrageous government conduct" defense to criminal prosecution are binding authority
and citing United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1231-33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 306, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992) as analyzing at length the four factors
weighed by the Sixth Circuit in determining whether government conduct was outrageous,
and rejecting the majority's notion that such treatment by the Sixth Circuit itself is dicta).
160 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1425 (citing United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.
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proceeded just as the Sixth Circuit in applying the Russell dicta, and
finding on every occasion that the facts did not bar prosecution.'
61
After concluding that there was no binding authority from the
Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit, the Tucker court held that the due
process defense "simply does not exist" in the Sixth Circuit. 62 The
court concluded that a defendant who raises a defense based on induce-
ment to commit the offense "is, by congressional intent and Supreme
Court precedent, limited to the defense of entrapment and its key element
of predisposition.', 63 The Tucker holding has three bases. First, induce-
ment does not itself violate due process even if it is "outrageous."'"
Second, the trial court lacks authority to dismiss an indictment on the
basis of governmental misconduct unless an independent constitutional
right has been violated. 65 Finally, the fact that this defense continues
to exist "stands as an invitation to violate the constitutional separation of
powers, intruding not only on the province of the Executive Branch but
the Legislative Branch as well."'
66
The first basis for the Sixth Circuit's holding is rooted in the concept
that the entrapment defense is itself based on congressional intent and not
the Due Process clause. 67 The Tucker court reasoned that since the
entrapment defense is implied in congressional intent, Congress could
choose not to allow such a defense.168 Hypothetically, if Congress were
to reverse the theoretical bar against convicting entrapped defendants,
then even non-predisposed defendants could be convicted for crimes
regardless of government inducement. Since due process would not be
violated in such a case, "a priori it is not offended by convicting those
who are predisposed."'
69
The second basis for the Tucker court's holding was that an objective
test for entrapment has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court,
and the government did not violate an independent protected right of the
defendant. 70 "[T]he balance between the desire to curb government
1978), which had relied on United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975), which
had been limited by Hampton and other decisions).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1426-27.
1631Id. at 1428.
'6Id. at 1427.
1
65 Id.
166 id.
167 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
168 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1427.
169 id.
170 See supra text accompanying note 165.
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inducement and the need to convict criminals is drawn at predisposition,
not 'outrageousness."""' In other words, the outrageous government
conduct defense is just another version of the objective entrapment test
rejected by the Supreme Court. Since inducement by itself does not
violate due process, no independent right of the defendant is violated.
Therefore, even outrageous conduct by the government does not give the
district court power to bar prosecution.'72
Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the defense must be rejected on
separation of powers grounds. The Executive Branch is answerable to the
electorate for its conduct in inducing defendants to commit crimes."'
Additionally, the Legislative Branch has implicitly limited the Executive
Branch by prohibiting conviction of non-predisposed defendants where
government action induced the commission of a crime.'7 4 The majority
reasoned that courts have no power to oversee the conduct of law
enforcement officials "[w]here no law has been broken [by the govern-
ment] and none of the defendants' constitutional rights have been
violated" because Congress has drawn the line at the defendant's subjec-
tive predisposition."'
B. Why the Defense Should Not Disappear
A due process argument has not been necessary to remedy miscon-
duct of law enforcement agents in certain important areas in which
overreaching has been recognized to be harmful to society.7 6 For
example, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well
as evidence later obtained as a direct result of that illegal seizure, is not
admitted at trial because it is in the interests of society to control searches
by law enforcement agents. 
177
In cases of outrageous overreaching by government agents, the
federal courts ought to take action to curtail this behavior, as well.
Society's interest in maintaining law enforcement and a court system free
171 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428.
'
72 Id. at 1427-28 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality opinion); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952)).
I73 d. at 1428.
I4 d. (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992)).
175 Id.
176 Paul Marcus, Toward an Expanded View of the Due Process Claim in Entrapment
Cases, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 73, 74 (1989).
177Id. at 75.
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of shocking conduct is just as compelling in a sting operation as it is in
a search and seizure case. The Court in Rochin could have relied on the
Fourth Amendment, but chose instead to focus on the overreaching by
government agents that it found shocking.' Contrary to the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Tucker, precedent has been set by the Court
establishing that without reference to an independent Constitutional right,
the guarantees of the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments justify limiting law enforcement conduct where society's
interests in judicial integrity are at stake.
Besides the general interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial
system, society also has a compelling interest in avoiding prosecutions
that target defendants capriciously. Whenever discretion lies in the hands
of the police, there is at least a minimal risk that a person will be targeted
for investigation based on political beliefs or lifestyle,'79 rather than in
the interest of a legitimate law enforcement need. The government should
not leave the choice of targets in the hands of confidential informants
who act as agents in exchange for consideration, whether monetary or
leniency in sentencing. 8 As the federal law now stands, there is simply
no check on the discretion held by law enforcement officials and their
agents to target defendants in sting operations.
Even if a defendant is targeted purely randomly, society cannot
tolerate such targeting because it is an inefficient allocation of resources.
Assume that an undercover sting to trap unwary criminals involves only
the cost of encouraging criminals to commit the crimes. For example, in
an undercover operation at a school, an agent offers to pay street value
for drugs. Students who are already dealing drugs at the school might be
caught by the sting. The cost of an undercover sting to trap unwary
innocents, however, involves what logically must be a higher inducement
since, by definition, innocents would not commit crime under the
conditions in which criminals normally would. As a logical consequence,
only a very high purchase price would induce a student, who does not
normally deal drugs, to do so on this occasion, and thereby be caught in
the sting. Some of the costs of sting operations include the time it takes
to convince the targets to participate in the sting, the complexity of sham
organizations and businesses, and the creative efforts of law enforcement
personnel in devising the schemes. In terms of these costs, if it takes
178Id. at 76.
179 See Gershman, supra note 11 (proposing that the courts require some level of
suspicion before targeting a suspect in a sting operation because of this danger).
' See United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764-65 (1991) (en bane) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959 (1992).
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more to get innocents to commit the crime, naturally it would be more
cost effective to society to target only criminals.
The problem is how to know beforehand whether an individual
selected as a target in a sting is a criminal or an innocent. If law
enforcement agents could only target a defendant in a sting after showing
a particular level of suspicion, the costs of stings would go down in
relation to the benefits. Sting operations are more likely to catch
criminals than innocents when they start by targeting a defendant who is
already suspected of wrongdoing. Since stings that catch criminals cost
less than stings that catch innocents, society would benefit by having
resources allocated more efficiently.
C. A Substantive Solution
The Supreme Court should impose a requirement that before the
government may target a defendant in a sting operation, a showing of
reasonable suspicion must be made.' 8' Such a standard would not
substantially impede law enforcement. It would serve the interests of
judicial integrity and of cost-effective law enforcement. Judicial imposi-
tion would relieve the legislature of its duty to codify the protection of
unpopular interests. Finally, it would not be against precedent to impose
such a requirement since the door was left open by the Court's holding
in Jacobson.
Imposition of a reasonable suspicion standard would not impede
effective law enforcement. Law enforcement officials should not be
required to meet a stricter probable cause requirement or to seek a
warrant because that would interfere with the practical requirements of
infiltrating criminal enterprises. However, merely requiring that govern-
ment agents demonstrate that they have chosen a target for a valid reason,
as opposed to a hunch, a prejudice, or some otherwise invalid personal
reason, would not impede valid law enforcement efforts since, presum-
ably, the majority of defendants are only targeted after reasonable
suspicion exists. An effective remedy for a failure by the government to
make a sufficient showing where the defendant was targeted without
reasonable suspicion would be suppression of the evidence gathered in
such a sting operation.
A requirement of reasonable suspicion would protect society's
legitimate interests. The courts would be shielded from the taint of
"' The scope of this section is limited to a substantive discussion of a reasonable
suspicion requirement, and does not address the procedural ramifications of the rule
suggested.
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overreaching because a reasonable basis standard would inhibit some
shocking conduct by agents. This is clearest in the case of informants
acting as agents. These agents would become subject to closer scrutiny
by the law enforcement officials who use them since they would also
need a reasonable basis for choosing targets.
The legislature should codify this requirement but will not because
the current trend is toward cracking down on criminals. No legislator
interested in continued employment wants to go on record as supporting
the rights of criminal defendants, especially criminal defendants who
assert that they actually committed the conduct and subsequently want to
be relieved of punishment. Therefore, the Court is in a unique position
to impose a requirement of reasonable suspicion before a defendant may
be targeted.
The Sixth Circuit held, in Tucker, that since (1) the entrapment
defense is based on Congressional intent, not the Constitution, and (2)
Congressional intent can be changed without violating the Constitution,
the Constitution is not violated by government overreaching. 82 This
reasoning assumes too much. The mere fact that the traditional justifica-
tion of the entrapment defense has evolved along the lines of Congressio-
nal intent rather than Constitutional lines does not conclusively prove that
the Constitution is not offended by government overreaching to convict
a predisposed defendant. This specious theoretical basis for the holding
in Tucker does not support eliminating a Constitutional defense which
draws a line at outrageousness rather than at predisposition.
The Supreme Court would not need to rule against precedent to
impose a reasonable suspicion requirement now. Based on its holdings in
Rochin, Russell, and Hampton, the door has been left open for a defense
based on due process that would be available to defendants regardless of
predisposition." 3 Since the court decided Jacobson without ruling on
a reasonable suspicion requirement, that issue has been left open.
In fact, the Court's holding in Jacobson could be read as a broad
requirement of reasonable suspicion before the government targets a
defendant in a sting operation. Such a reading would side-step the
separation of powers issue raised by the Sixth Circuit in Tucker and
12 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
183 Rochin v. People of Calif., 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) ("While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process would
absolutely bar the government from invokingjudicial processesto obtain a conviction...
the instant case is distinctly not of that breed."); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,
489 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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would promote efficient law enforcement by way of the courts. Jacobson
requires that the government show that a defendant was predisposed
before any action by an agent to induce the commission. Logically, a
showing of predisposition must be based on at least some evidence of
conduct manifesting that predisposition. If the Court intended the lower
courts to require a particular level of suspicion, it chose language that
was too subtle to convey that message. But there is still time to correct
this problem, given the many, many criminal defendants who appeal
indictments and convictions on the basis of the due process defense. The
Supreme Court should review the very next one of those cases and
explicitly impose the reasonable suspicion requirement described.
Dana M Todd

